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ENDING MARRIAGE AS WE KNOW IT
Nancy D. Polikoff
Marriage as we know it is a status unlike any other, conferring
benefits and responsibilities unavailable to those in other close personal
relationships. Consider the following example:
During the unrelenting investigation into President Clinton's
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, prosecutor Kenneth Starr compelled
a distraught Marcia Lewis, Lewinsky's mother, to testify before the
grand jury about her daughter's confidences.' Lewinsky lived with her
mother and had sought her advice in the context of their close motherdaughter bond.2 However natural it was for Lewinsky to unburden
herself to her mother, Starr had the power to force Lewis to betray her
daughter's trust, and he shamelessly wielded that power. 3
Had Lewinsky been married, and had she confided in her husband,
her revelations would have been protected by the evidentiary privilege
that shields from disclosure communications between a husband and
wife. 4 Evidence law thus offers those who are married something it
withholds from those who are not-a sphere of intimate communication
protected from state intrusion, a relationship of trust so important to
individual well-being and social cohesion that no one can compel the
destruction of that trust, even to learn "the truth" about a crime. 5

* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I would like to
thank Amy Stewart, Washington College of Law Class of 2004, whose interest in and understanding
of these issues, coupled with her intelligence and dedication, made her a perfect research assistant
for this project. I also appreciate the summer research grant from Washington College of Law Dean
Claudio Grossman that enabled me to complete this Article.
1. See Lorraine Adams, Confidences Became a Mother's Ordeal,WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1998,
at A27; Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Lewinsky's Mother Overcome By Emotion During
Testimony, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al.
2. See Baker & Goldstein, supra note 1.
3. See Adams, supranote 1; Baker & Goldstein, supranote 1.
4. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2232 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
5. For an intriguing analysis of the marital communication privilege, as well as the spousal
privilege against giving adverse testimony, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW

AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 89-135 (1999). Professor Regan is a strong proponent of the role
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Marcia Lewis in despair brought public attention to forced betrayal
of a child seeking comfort and advice from her mother. Editorials and
columnists argued for the creation of a parent-child communication
privilege.6 I advocate here a more sweeping reform, incorporating
recognition in every area of the law of the diversity of adult relationships
characterized by emotional intimacy and economic interdependence. The
law should no longer reward marriage above all other relationships. 7
Part I of this Article reviews the most comprehensive analysis to
date of the reasons to extend the reach of the law beyond marriage, a
report entitled Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close
Personal Adult Relationships ("Beyond Conjugality"), released by the
Law Commission of Canada in December, 2001.8 The report presents a
methodology that implements its analysis, by articulating the objectives
of any law and determining what relationships should be included to
meet those objectives. Part II considers those aspects of American law
of law in strengthening loyalty, trust, connection, and commitment uniquely in marriage, and he
analyzes spousal privilege in that light.
6. See Margaret Carlson, Should a Mom Rat on Her Daughter?, TIME, Feb. 23, 1998, at 25
("Surely the parent-child bond is equal to that between husband and wife.... The Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination ought to include the right not to incriminate a child."); Anna
Quindlen, Plenty of Privilege, But Not for Parents,CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 23 ("The lack
of [parent-child] privilege is illogical, and defies both common sense and the public weal. In today's
atmosphere of easy divorce, the ties of parenthood often trump those of matrimony.").
7. Elsewhere I have argued for the abolition of marriage as a legal category, joining other
distinguished legal scholars. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should
Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167 (2000) [hereinafter Polikoff,
Lesbians and Gay Men]; Nancy D. Polikoff, An End to All Marriage,WASH. BLADE (July 25, 2003),
available at http://www.washingtonblade.com/2003/7-25/view/columns/endmarrige.cfm; see also
generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, NEUTERED MOTHER];

Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?,9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239 (2001); Ruthann Robson,
The State of Marriage, 1 Y.B.N.Z. JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1997). Although I continue to believe that
ending the legal category of marriage would be the preferable family law reform, this Article, which
advocates eliminating the unique role of marriage in law, would end marriage as we know it and is a
more realistic endeavor.
8.
CLOSE

See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS
(2001), available at http://collection.nlc-

bnc.ca/l00/200/301/lcc-cdc/beyond conjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter BEYOND CONJUGALITY]. An earlier report from the British Columbia Law Institute
(BCLI) also addressed how the law should respond to a variety of family relationships. See BRITISH
COLUMBIA LAW

INSTITUTE: REPORT ON RECOGNITION OF SPOUSAL AND FAMILY STATUS

[hereinafter BCLI REPORT], available at http://www.bcli.org/. The focus of this report was
provincial, rather than federal, law. Therefore it addressed matters omitted from BEYOND
CONJUGALITY, such as consequences as between the two parties upon dissolution of the relationship.
For further clarification of the family law matters within the jurisdiction of the Canadian federal and
provincial governments, see Susan B. Boyd & Claire F.L. Young, "From Same-Sex to No Sex"?:
Trends Towards Recognition of (Same-Sex) Relationships in Canada, I SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 757
(2003).
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that already reflect the methodology of Beyond Conjugality as evidence
that implementation of such a methodology is possible if advocates
embrace this approach. Part III contemplates the role a relationship
registration scheme could play in allocating rights and obligations and
explains why such a system should not be a substitute for the rigorous
methodology advanced in Beyond Conjugality. Part IV presents the
limitations of, and indeed the dangers posed by, the movement toward
gay and lesbian marriage in the United States. By constantly hammering
at the injustice of excluding same-sex couples from the benefits and
obligations of marriage, this movement, perhaps inadvertently, solidifies
the differential treatment of the married and the unmarried. Rather than
dethrone marriage from its favored status, a development that would
honor all relationships, this movement seeks privileges for gay and
lesbian relationships that mirror heterosexual marriage. This is not
optimal family policy.
I.

BEYOND CONJUGALITY: THE CANADIAN VISION

In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada released its report, Beyond
Conjugality.9 It calls for radical revisions in the law to honor and support
all caring and interdependent personal adult relationships. 10 Although the
report favors equality between same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
including equal access to marriage, it denominates both types of
relationships conjugal in nature. 1 The very title of the document, Beyond
Conjugality, conveys the more profound conclusion that "governments
9. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at i.
10. See id. at xxiv-xxv.
11. See id. at ix-x. Although the term "conjugal" is used commonly in Canadian case law and
statutes to denote "marriage-like," its definition is imprecise. See Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder,
What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269 (2001).
Although sexual relations are ordinarily a central, if not defining, aspect of a conjugal relationship,
Canadian law relies on a flexible evaluation of seven factors, only one of which involves sex, for
determining conjugality. See id at 287-91. Scholars responding to the case law have noted that
"judicial understanding of conjugality now comes close to an 'I know it when I see it' approach." Id.
at 299.
Unlike in Canada, American law does not commonly use the term "conjugal" to
differentiate one set of relationships from others. Nonetheless, I use the term in this Article. I mean it
to signify relationships that, even if not currently sexual, at one point contained a sexual component
that deepened the tie between the two individuals. Martha Fineman's groundbreaking work on the
family critiques the centrality of sexual affiliation in law and society. See, e.g., FINEMAN, NEUTERED
MOTHER, supra note 7. She uses the term "sexual family," although at one point she uses it
interchangeably with "conjugal family." See id. at 143-44. Because I advocate that no legal
significance attach specifically to conjugal relationships but not to others, I have no need to carefully
define the meaning of the term.
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need to pursue a more comprehensive and principled approach to the
legal recognition and support of the full range of close personal
' 12
relationships among adults."
The Canadian approach to family structures has differed
significantly from ours over recent years. Two constitutional cases in the
Supreme Court of Canada in the 1990s extended specific rights and
13
responsibilities of marriage to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples.
The 2000 federal Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act then
virtually eliminated the legal difference between marital and nonmarital
conjugal relationships. 14 If the Law Commission of Canada, in
furtherance of its mandate to "consider measures that will make the legal
system more efficient, economical, accessible and just,"' 5 had merely
concluded that the law should equalize the treatment of married and
unmarried couples, it would have expressed little that was not already
16
within the mainstream of Canadian thought.
The United States is at no such point. No federal constitutional
principle requires equal treatment of married and unmarried heterosexual
couples, let alone gay and lesbian couples. Although there are a few
significant victories in state legislatures1 7 or in state courts, through
statutory interpretation18 or state constitutional interpretation,' 9 federal
legislation expresses the value that heterosexual married couples are
always the preferred social unit. 20 From the Defense of Marriage Act2' to

BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supranote 8, at ix.
13. See id.
at 14.
14. See id.
15. Id.at xxiv.
16. For a thorough review of both statutory and case law concerning nonmarital family
relationships in Canada, see Nicholas Bala, Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of
Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, 29 QUEENS L. J. _ (forthcoming Fall
2003); see also Boyd & Young, supra note 8.
17. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2003) (creating a domestic partnership scheme
open to same-sex couples and to opposite-sex couples in which one or both partners is eligible to
receive Old Age Insurance Benefits under Social Security).
18. In Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., the New York court held that the definition of family under the
non-eviction provision of New York's rent control laws should include the same-sex life partner of
the deceased tenant whose relationship with the decedent fulfilled certain functional criteria. See 543
N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (N.Y. 1989).
19. In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common Benefits Clause of
its state constitution mandated that same-sex couples be given the same rights, benefits, and
responsibilities under state law as married heterosexual couples. See 744 A.2d 864, 886-87 (Vt.
1999).
20. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (defining
marriage as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and defining
spouse as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife").
12.
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welfare reform,2 2 the United States government has taken numerous
opportunities to exalt heterosexual marriage. Deviation from this model
engenders scorn, stigma, and legally sanctioned discrimination.
Government offers both carrots 23 and sticks 24 to stave off all initiatives
that respect, value, and strengthen the diversity of families present in
American society.
It is this very diversity within Canadian society that Beyond
Conjugality celebrates. "Recognizing and supporting personal adult
relationships that involve caring and interdependence is an important
state objective," it states. After praising extension of the rights and
obligations once associated only with marriage to unmarried
heterosexual and same-sex couples, the report notes the limits of such
reforms. "[T]his extension of rights and obligations has maintained the
legal focus on conjugal relationships. A more principled and
comprehensive approach is needed to consider not just the situation of
spcuses and common-law partners, but also the needs of persons in nonconjugal relationships, including caregiver relationships. 2 6
The Commission grounds its development of a new legal
framework for addressing personal adult relationships in two
fundamental values--equality and autonomy. The equality principle
mandates both equality within relationships and relational equality,
which requires governments to "respect and promote equality between
different kinds of relationships., 27 The principle of relational equality
requires more than equal treatment of conjugal couples because
21. See id. § 2 (legislating that a state is not required to give credit or effect to law of another
state "respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other [s]tate").
22. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (1996) (proclaiming marriage to be "the foundation of a
successful society.... and an essential institution of a successful society which promotes the
interests of children," as findings in support of pro-marriage welfare reform); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2003) (stating that the purposes of state grants under Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families are prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and formation and promotion of two-parent
families).
23. State governments may offer additional cash benefits for welfare recipient families
consisting of a married man and woman and dependent children of either or both of them. See, e.g.,
W. VA. CODE § 9-9-6 (2003).
24. State school systems that teach anything other than abstinence-only sex education, which
includes the principle that "a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in context of marriage is
the expected standard of human sexual activity," cannot receive federal funding for their sex
education programs. 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2003).
25. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supranote 8, at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 13.
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"conjugality, like marriage itself, is not an accurate marker of the
qualitative attributes of personal 28adult relationships that are relevant to
particular legislative objectives.,
The autonomy principle recognizes that "the freedom to choose
whether and with whom to form close personal relationships is a
fundamental value in free and democratic societies. 2 9
The report continues:
[G]overnments put in place the conditions in which people can freely
choose their close personal relationships. The state must also avoid
direct or indirect forms of coercive interference with adults' freedom to
choose whether or not to form, or remain in, close personal
relationships.... [Governments] should not create financial or other
kinds of pressure to discourage relationships without reference to their
qualitative attributes. Autonomy is compromised if the state provides
one relationship status with more benefits and legal support than others,
or conversely, if the state imposes more penalties on one type of
relationship than it does on others.... The state ought to support any
and all relationships that have the capacity to further relevant social
goals, and to remain neutral
with respect to individuals' choice of a
30
particular form or status.
From these principles, the Commission develops a methodology
with which to analyze all laws and programs. It identifies four basic steps
in evaluating any law.
QUESTION 1: Does the law pursue a legitimate policy objective? If not,
the law ought to be repealed or fundamentally reconsidered.
QUESTION 2: If the law's objectives are sound, do relationships matter?
Are the relationships that are included important or relevant to the
law's objectives? If not, revise the law to consider the individual and to
remove the unnecessary relational reference.
QUESTION 3: If relationships do matter, could the law allow individuals
to choose which of their own close personal relationships they want to
be subject to the law? If so, revise the law to permit self-definition of
relevant relationships.
QUESTION 4: If relationships do matter, and public policy requires that
the law delineate the relevant relationships to which it applies, can the
law be revised to more accurately capture the relevant range of

28. Id. at 15.

29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 18.
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relationships? If so, revise the law to include the appropriate
mix of
31
functional definitions and formal kinds of relationship status.
The Commission's report applies this methodology to much of
Canadian law. The subjects covered include: who may be compensated
for relationship harm upon negligently caused injury or death; 32 who is
entitled to bereavement or caregiver leave; 33 who may be sponsored
under immigration law; 34 who is disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits because his/her employer is a relative; 35 whose
transactions may be nullified under bankruptcy law because they are
between family members; 36 and numerous provisions of 39the Income Tax
38
Act, 37 Old Age Security Act, and Canada Pension Plan.
As an example, consider the Commission's analysis of the
evidentiary privilege with which this Article begins. The report notes
that, under current law, if a spouse testifies, she may invoke the marital
communications privilege and thereby refuse to reveal communications
with her spouse during the marriage.40 The privilege enables spouses to
"treat their marriages as safe havens where they can unburden
themselves through intimate conversation without fear of incriminating
themselves." 41 The state may wish to find the truth, but "promoting
candour and trust in marital relationships" prevails without exception.42
The Commission criticizes the current regime from two
perspectives. First, it can lead to exclusion of evidence even when the
state's interests in obtaining the truth outweigh the relational interests at
stake.43 Applying its methodology, the Commission elaborates upon the
objective of the privilege, stating that:
Candour and trust are essential aspects of emotionally supportive
personal relationships. Forcing witnesses to violate that trust
jeopardizes what may be their most important sources of affection and

31.

Id. at 30.

32.
33.
34.

See id. at 37-40.
See id. at 40-43.
See id. at 43-46.

35. See id. at 55-59.
36. See id. at 59-62.
37.
38.
39.

See id.at 63.
See id. at 89-95.
See id. at 96-99.

40. See id. at 46.
41. Id at 49.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 52.
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emotional support, and sends a signal to others that the privacr4 of
communications with loved ones will not be respected by the state. o
The Commission concludes that promoting candor and trust in close
personal relationships is a legitimate policy objective, although this
objective does not always outweigh the state's interest in obtaining the
truth in criminal trials. Thus, the Commission concludes, the privilege
should not be absolute.4 5
The Commission then opposes a policy under which, when
relational interests outweigh the interest in discovering the truth, only
marital relationships are protected. Since self-definition of relevant
relationships is not appropriate here, the Commission advocates law
revision to more accurately capture the relevant range of relationships.4 6
It reviews suggestions that the connection between the witness and the
accused be one of "family or similar ties," an "intimate relationship," or
a "close personal relationship of primary importance in the individuals'48
lives. ' 47 It specifically approves extending the privilege to a best friend.
The Commission settles upon a variation on Australian law that allows a
judge to weigh the nature and extent of the harm to the witness, and to
the relationship between the witness and the defendant, against the

44. Id.
45. See id.
at 53.
46. See id.Professor Regan's book, which analyzes spousal privilege in depth, includes a
defense of marriage as a demarcation line in law, and thus does not explore expansion of the
relationships to which the privilege might apply. He answers the rhetorical question, "Why
marriage?," by calling upon "its continuing power as a symbol of enduring rather than transitory
attachment" and "the fact that marriage continues to hold a distinctive place in the cultural
imagination." REGAN, supra note 5, at 7. He further invokes "the significance of marriage to many
peoples' lives." Id. at 8. He identifies marriage as "a relationship that most believe should engage
our being more fully than any other adult attachment." Id.at 205. Whatever the validity of these
statements, they fail to acknowledge the myriad forces, including law itself, that produce and
perpetuate our perceptions. See infra note 141. Perhaps more saliently, Professor Regan identifies
and then answers the following crucial question:
How can we tame individual desire for the sake of communal stability when society
regards individuals as "self-authenticating sources of valid claims?"
Marriage has long been seen in Western culture as a symbol of this enterprise ... It
has served as a way of channeling powerful and volatile drives for sexual gratification
and individual fulfillment into an arrangement that furthers interests in procreation and
social stability.
REGAN, supra note 5, at 10 (endnote omitted). I disagree with Professor Regan's emphasis on
marriage because I find other family forms equally, if not better, able to further the interests of
procreation and social stability.
47. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supranote 8, at 53.
48. See id.
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desirability of the court receiving the
Commission's Recommendation 12 reads:

evidence. 49 Thus,

the

Parliament should replace the marital communications privilege with
an amendment to the Canada Evidence Act that enables judges to
prevent the divulgence of a confidential communication if the witness
had a close personal relationship with the accused at the time the
communication was made, and the need to protect and promote candour
and trust in close personal
50 relationships outweighs the desirability of
admitting the testimony.
Acknowledging that this "more sensitive and flexible balancing of
interests" can produce complexity and uncertainty, the Commission
notes that a form of this balancing test has been working satisfactorily in
Australia for several years. 5'
With the framework provided in Beyond Conjugality, Marcia Lewis
would very likely have been able to guard her daughter's confidences.
They had a close personal relationship; they lived together; there
appeared to be a natural bond of trust between them. Both found Lewis's
compelled testimony devastating. Weighing against this the slight value
of the evidence Marcia Lewis could provide, given other evidence
available in the Starr investigation, a judge would most likely have
excluded the testimony. That would have been the right result for the
right reasons.
II. AMERICAN LAW AND THE BEYOND CONJUGALITY METHODOLOGY
The methodology of the Canadian report is not entirely foreign to
American law. When relationships matter to achieving a law's
objectives,52 Beyond Conjugality first determines if individuals can

49. See id at 53-55. Perhaps because this rule has no counterpart in American law, Professor
Regan does not consider it in his extensive analysis of spousal privilege. See REGAN, supra note 5.
50.

BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supranote 8, at 55.

51. Id. at 54.
52. Relationships do not always matter to achieving a law's objectives. Personal income
taxation is one area in which the Law Commission of Canada reaches this conclusion. After
extensive analysis, the Report concludes that the individual, rather than the conjugal couple or any
other definition of family unit, should remain the basis for calculation of income tax liability. See id
at 65-71. Although the individual has been the basis for calculating tax liability in Canada since the
inception of personal income taxation in 1917, for the most part American law has recognized a
husband and a wife as a single taxable unit since 1948. See Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativityand
FederalTax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REv. 129, 144 (1998). Some scholars note the inequality faced
by gay men and lesbians and advocate extending the marital taxable unit to same-sex couples. See,
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decide for themselves which relationships will be subject to the law.
Only if this is not possible or practical does the law then attempt to
accurately capture the full range of relationships that should be
included.53 Portions of American law reflect each of these steps.
A.

Beyond Conjugality's Question Three: Self-Definition

Anyone who has filled out a form in a doctor's office or a personnel
office has answered a question asking whom to notify in case of
emergency. The form may ask the individual what relationship she has
with the person she names, but it does not require that the individual
name someone with a specified relationship, such as spouse, partner,
parent or child. The individual chooses for herself whom she wants
notified. She may choose based on close family relationship, but she may
also choose the person most easily reachable by phone, the person
located closest to the doctor's office or the workplace, or the person she
considers best able to respond calmly under pressure.
This principle of self-designation exists as well in law. For example,
it is the norm in wills, where donative freedom is the overarching
principle.54 Although surviving spouses are often entitled to some share
of a decedent's estate even if a will provides to the contrary, others
cannot make such claims. Parents can disinherit their children, for
example, even when they are minors or physically or mentally disabled. 55
e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, I LAW & SEXUALITY 97, 98

(1991). Professor Knauer, however, notes:
To the extent same-sex couples want the tax code to recognize their relationships,
they are at odds with the emerging consensus that the individual and not the married
couple should be the appropriate unit of taxation. Thus, lesbian and gay scholars seem to
be asking for inclusion in the very regime that other progressive scholars are trying to
dismantle.
Knauer, supra at 157 (footnote omitted). Mirroring Question 2 of the BEYOND CONJUGALITY

methodology, Knauer continues:
Tax parity for same-sex couples under the existing marital provisions ... is only a
viable proposal if one accepts that marital status is a relevant and appropriate factor in
determining tax liability. If marital status is not deemed a relevant factor, then one
alternative would be to dismantle the marital provisions completely. Once the benchmark
of the married couple is no longer privileged,. . . [s]ame-sex couples and married couples
would be on equal footing because the law would recognize neither.
Id. at 211. BEYOND CONJUGALITY has indeed deemed relationships not relevant to determining
personal income tax liability.
53.

See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 33-36.

54. Scholars have criticized court decisions that trample upon this principle by too easily
invalidating wills devising property to those who are not the decedent's traditionally defined family
members. See generally Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of InheritanceLaw, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 199 (2001).

55. Seeid at220-21.
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An individual can leave her estate to anyone she wishes, no matter how
distasteful, emotionally jarring, or financially disastrous to those left
behind.56
An individual can also designate a surrogate to make healthcare
decisions. This can be any person the individual wishes, and need not be
a relative, even if the individual is married or has living parents or adult
children.57 Question Three of the Beyond Conjugality methodology asks
whether a law could allow individuals to choose which of their own close
personal relationships they want to be subject to the law.58 When
designating a substitute healthcare decisionmaker, the law can-and
does-allow individuals to make such choices. Thus, an individual with
a spouse can bypass that marital relationship to select a different
individual.
The federal statute passed several months after September 11, 2001,
entitled the Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety
Officers' Benefits Act of 2002, also reflects this principle.59 Under a
1968 law, the federal government was providing a one-time $250,000
death benefit to the surviving spouse or child of a public safety officer
killed in the line of duty.6 ° When a much loved New York City fire
chaplain, Mychal Judge, died on September llth with no spouse or
child,6 ' the law was amended to make the benefit payable, in the absence
of a spouse or child,62 to the person named as beneficiary on the officer's
life insurance policy. 63 Media coverage noted that this statute facilitates
56. See id. at 209.
57. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(B) (Michie 2002) ("An adult or emancipated minor,

while having capacity, may designate any individual to act as surrogate by personally informing the
supervising health-care provider.").
58. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 30.
59. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796 (Law. Co-op. 2003); see also Pub. L. No. 107-196 (noting that the
short title for this act is "Mychal Judge Police and Fire Chaplains Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act
of 2002").
60. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), 1204 (1968) (current version at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 3796(a)-(b)
(2003)).
61. Mychal Judge was an openly gay Catholic priest. See Chuck Colbert, Notre Dame Gay
Alumni, Phil Donahue Honor Fr. Mychal Judge, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Oct. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.natcath.org/NCROnline/archives/101802/101802j.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004); see
also generally MICHAEL FORD, FATHER MYCHAL JUDGE: AN AUTHENTIC AMERICAN HERO (2002).
62. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796b(3) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (defining child as:
[A]ny natural, illegitimate, adopted, or posthumous child or stepchild of a deceased
public safety officer who, at the time of the public safety officer's death, is-(i) 18 years
of age or under; (ii) over 18 years of age and a student as defined in section 8101 of title
5, United States Code; or (iii) over 18 years of age and incapable of self-support because
of physical or mental disability).

63.

See 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796.

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 9

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:201

receipt of government benefits by a same-sex surviving partner, the only
federal law to do S0.64
Recognition of a same-sex couple under this federal statute is a
byproduct of the principles animating the law. Congress recognized that
not all public safety officers have a wife or children; it wished to honor
equally all those killed in the line of duty; therefore, it determined to
make the death benefit available to all. Congress could have chosen to
make the payment to the decedent's estate, thus passing through the laws
of intestacy if the decedent lacked a will. 65 It also could have chosen to
make the payment directly to the legal next of kin or to those who would
have inherited from the decedent had he died intestate, thus bypassing
anyone named in a will in favor of conventionally defined family
members. Instead, it implemented the principle of self-definition by
accepting the choice of the decedent concerning who should receive
compensation upon his
death, as expressed by the choice of life66
insurance beneficiary.
Self-definition could be made easier.67 It could also be extended to
many more areas of law, as the Canadian report recommends.68 It is a
concept familiar to American law, where it sometimes trumps the
primacy of marriage. 69 Allowing greater self-definition of what
relationships matter for specific purposes is a critical step towards ending
marriage as we know it.

64. See, e.g., Lou Chibbaro Jr., Congress Passes DP Bill for Firefighters, Police Officers:
White House Mum on Whether Bush will Sign Measure Named After Gay Priest, WASH. BLADE,
June 21, 2002.
65. Current intestacy laws have been criticized for their failure to adequately reflect family life
today. See generally Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW &
INEQUALITY 1 (2000); Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and
Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917 (1989). For one reform proposal, see E. Gary Spitko, An
Accrual/Multi-FactorApproach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for UnmarriedCommitted Partners,
81 OR. L. REv. 255, 258 (2002).
66. See42 U.S.C.S. § 3796.
67. For example, every application for a motor vehicle license could require the applicant to
designate a surrogate healthcare decisionmaker, in the absence of any later writing to the contrary.
This would be only slightly more onerous that requiring applicants to indicate if they wish to be
organ donors.
68. See, e.g., infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text (discussing self-definition in the
context of care taking leave).
69. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text, for a discussion of examples of selfdefinition in American law, including surrogate decisionmaking.
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B. Beyond Conjugality's Question Four. Capturingthe Relevant Range
of Relationships
Question Four of the Canadian report's methodology is triggered
when self-definition is inappropriate and a law must capture the range of
relationships that are relevant to achieving that law's objectives.7 °
Without necessarily articulating the question as the Canadian
methodology does, American law implements this methodology in state
statutes designed to protect victims of domestic violence. These statutes
create a civil action enabling a petitioner to obtain an order of protection
and related remedies. 71 Each state law identifies limited categories of
individuals entitled to apply for such orders.7 z Early statutes covered
intimate partners only when they were married to each other and still
living together.7 3 When such laws were enacted, before violence against

70. Question Four is also necessary to establish default rules for when an individual allowed to
self-define the relevant relationship fails to do so. For example, when an individual does not name a
substitute healthcare decisionmaker, a statute facilitating decisionmaking by another must assign that
status to someone. While statutes typically designate a spouse, parent, or adult child, recent
amendments to District of Columbia law present a better model. First priority, in the absence of a
court-appointed guardian, is given to a spouse or domestic partner, defined as "an adult person living
with, but not married to, another adult person in a committed, intimate relationship." D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-2202 (2003). In addition, the term encompasses anyone who has registered as domestic
partners, a status available to anyone living together in "a familial relationship ... characterized by
mutual caring" D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (2003). In the absence of such a person, authority goes in
order of priority to an adult child, a parent, an adult sibling, and then a close friend. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-2210. "Close friend" is defined as "any adult who has exhibited significant care and
concern for the patient, and has maintained regular contact with the patient so as to be familiar with
his or her activities, health, and religious and moral beliefs." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2202(1A).
Recognizing that the designated order of priority might not be appropriate in all cases, the statute
makes it a rebuttable presumption, rather than absolute. The presumption is rebutted if "a person of
lower priority is found to have better knowledge of the wishes of the patient, or, if the wishes of the
patient are unknown and cannot be ascertained, is better able to demonstrate a good-faith belief as to
the interests of the patient." D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210(f).
71. For an overview of state statutes, see generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff,
Providing Legal Protectionfor Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993).

72. See id.at 814-42.
73. For example, Maryland had limited eligibility to file to "spouses, parents, children, or
blood relatives who live together at the time of the abuse." See Barbee v. Barbee, 537 A.2d 224, 224
(Md. 1988) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(e) (1984)). In Barbee, a woman brought
an action against her husband for striking her with his fists and threatening her at work; the fact that
the spouses did not reside together at the time of the abuse indicated that the law was not applicable.
See 537 A.2d at 224. A New York statute covering assaults between "spouses," parents and children,
and members of the same household, was held inapplicable to a divorced couple who no longer lived
together. See People v. Williams, 248 N.E.2d 8, 12-13 (N.Y. 1969).
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women was recognized as a significant social problem, 74 their purpose
was to "reach and treat the roots of family discord" and save marriages.75
In the 1970s, feminists demanded that the state respond more forcefully
to violence against women and, among other things, lobbied to make
these statutes more effective at stopping violence.7 6
These efforts resulted in civil protection order statutes in all states
by the early 1990s, many enacted or significantly amended in the mid1980s and later. 77 Once the goal was stopping violence, not saving
marriages or treating household problems, eligibility for relief under the
statutes was expanded to reflect more of the relationships in which
women were likely to encounter violent domination. Advocates argued
that family members covered by statutes should be defined to reflect "all
concepts of family as they exist in the reality of our diverse family
relationships" and all intimate and dating relationships. 78 By 1993, fortysix jurisdictions covered unmarried partners living together, and thirtysix covered same-sex intimate partners. 79 Forty-seven jurisdictions
covered family members, expansively defined. 80 The laws of forty-three
jurisdictions applied to a couple with a child in common. 81
In the context of intimate violence, the United States Congress
agrees that marriage should not be the dividing line between those who
are protected under federal law and those who are not. Thus, the crime of
interstate domestic violence, created by the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"), punishes interstate travel, and the facilitation of
interstate travel, involving commission of a crime of violence against a
"spouse or intimate partner." 82 Those terms include spouses, former

74. In the late 1960s a movement of feminist activists and lawyers began to bring the

problem of woman abuse to public attention. At the time, there was no legal recognition
of a harm of violence against women by intimates-today known as domestic violence. It
simply didn't exist in the legal vocabulary.
[V]irtually no public discussion of wife beating took place from the beginning of the
twentieth century until the mid-I 970s.
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 3, 20 (2000).
75. Williams, 248 N.E.2d at 9-10, 13.
76. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 71, at 810.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 820; see id. at 818, 829.
79. See id. at 829, 832. A recent report lists six states with statutes explicitly excluding samesex couples from the categories of eligible individuals. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 2001: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTIVIOLENCE PROGRAMS, available at http://www.avp.org/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
80. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 71, at 816-17.

81. Seeid. at 824-25.
82. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2261 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
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spouses, persons who share a child in common, persons who cohabit or
have cohabited as a spouse, and "any other person similarly situated to a
spouse who is protected by the domestic or family violence laws of the
in which the injury occurred or where the
State or tribal jurisdiction
83
victim resides.,

The VAWA provision requiring that every state accord full faith
and credit to any protection order issued by another state protects an even
broader group of persons than those covered by the federal criminal
provisions. 84 A "protection order" is defined as "any injunction or other
order issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or
harassment against, or contact or communication with or physical
proximity to, another person."85 An earlier draft of VAWA limited a
"protection order" under the Act to orders against a spouse or intimate
partner. 86 The version as enacted means that an order from a state with an
orders must be honored by
expansive definition of who may obtain such
87
states whose own laws are more restrictive.
The first critical step in applying Question Four of Beyond
Conjugality's methodology is identifying a law's objectives.
Recognizing certain relationships under the law flows from that
determination. When protection order statutes were designed to save
marriages, there was logic in limiting their reach to cohabiting married
couples. 88 The contemporary goal of stopping violence is frustrated, not
furthered, by such a cramped definition.
Consider one other example from Beyond Conjugality of capturing
the range of relationships that advance a law's objectives. With respect to
recovery in tort for negligently caused relational loss, the report applauds
83.

18 U.S.C.S. § 2266(7)(B). One Circuit Court has approved application of this statute to the

murder of a woman by the man with whom she had lived. See United States v. Bamette, 211 F.3d

803, 814, 815 (4th Cir. 2000). After reviewing the intimate details of the couple's relationship, the
Court held that the evidence "ma[de] it clear that the intimate relationship between Barnette and
Miss Williams, although not husband and wife, was 'like' that of husband and wife." Id. at 815.
84. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2265(a) (Law. Co-op. 2003).
85. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2266(5) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (emphasis added).
86. The Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-197, at 20 (1991).
87. Thus, for example, a state must give full faith and credit to a protective order issued in the

context of a same-sex relationship, even if its own state law clearly excludes gay men and lesbians
from obtaining such orders.
88.

A recent version of this type of reasoning is found in Puerto Rico v. Martinez, in which the

Supreme Court of Puerto Rico refused to apply its domestic violence statute to a same-sex couple.
According to a newspaper article describing the opinion, the court identified the purpose of the
statute as "'strengthen[ing] the institution of the family,' defined as one of a 'sentimental and legal
union between a man and a woman."' Ivan Roman, Gay-Rights Issues Bring Protestors to Street,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 20, 2003, at A10.
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the civil law approach in Quebec which allows such recovery without
limiting those who may recover to a narrow list.8 9 Recovery depends

upon the facts of the particular relationship and the quality of the injury
complained of.90 The report supports the principle that "no barriers based
on relationship status should be put in the way of individuals' ability to
prove a relational loss in court.... The entitlement to compensation is

based on proving relational loss, rather than on the status of a
relationship.

' 91

In the United States, New Mexico has come closest to implementing
this principle through its case law. Noting that it is common for extended
family to live together, the New Mexico Supreme Court allowed a
grandmother living with her granddaughter to sue for loss of consortium
after a pharmacy error resulted in the child's death.92 Subsequently, the
same court allowed a long-term, cohabiting heterosexual partner to file
such an action.93 Echoing Beyond Conjugality's methodology, the court
reasoned as follows:
We must consider the purpose behind the cause of action for loss of
consortium. A person brings this claim to recover for damage to a
relational interest, not a legal interest. To use the legal status as a proxy
for a significant enough relational interest is not the most precise way
to determine to whom a duty is owed. Furthermore, the use of legal
status necessarily excludes many persons whose loss of a significant
relational interest may be just as devastating as the loss of a legal
spouse.94
The process of identifying a law's objectives will force those who
are ideologically committed to the primacy of heterosexual marriage to
articulate that view and defend it against other possible objectives.
Consider the disaster relief available from private agencies after
September 11, 2001. Reverend Louis Sheldon argued that aid should be
awarded "on the basis and priority of one man and one woman in a
marital relationship. 96 The Red Cross, however, articulated its goal as
meeting the "disaster-related needs of all persons, regardless of race,
89.

See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 38.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
Id. at 39.
See Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774, 784 (N.M. 1998).
See Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 961 (N.M. 2003).
Id.at 955.
For a comprehensive review of governmental and private responses to the surviving same-

sex partners of those killed on September 11,2001, see Nancy J. Knauer, The September II Attacks
and Surviving Same-Sex Partners:Defining Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 31 (2002).

96. Id. at 90 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual preference or orientation. 97 An
organization run by Sheldon would have aided only surviving spouses,
but the Red Cross, in order to meet its objectives, assisted "those who
were unmarried, living together, or in committed relationships, persons
not living together who nonetheless relied on a victim's support, 98and
roommates of victims, all regardless of gender or sexual orientation.,
This step in the Beyond Conjugality methodology is both rational
and revolutionary. It is rational because it seeks to tailor the definitions
of the relationships that matter to a law's specific objectives. It is
revolutionary because it dislodges marriage from its singularly privileged
place in law and recognizes the equal value of other relationships that
fulfill critical social functions.

III. THE ROLE

OF REGISTRATION SCHEMES

A relationship registration scheme can coexist with the Beyond
Conjugality methodology but cannot replace it. Registration is an
efficient method of designating who matters for whatever purpose the
registration regime specifies. After more than twenty years of both public
and private registration schemes, there is no uniformly accepted
definition of who may register and no universally defined set of ensuing
consequences.99 Rather, each jurisdiction that creates a status available
through registration, commonly called registered or domestic
partnership, 100 must make two principal policy determinations: 1) who is
eligible to register and 2) what entitlements and obligations flow from
registration.
97. Id. at 91 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. See generally Julianna S.Gonen, Same-Sex Unions & Domestic Partnerships, 2 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 329 (2001) (reviewing the various aspects of domestic partnership programs, both
state and municipal, that exist within the United States); Megan E. Callan, Comment, The More, the
Not Marry-Er: In Search ofa Policy Behind Eligibility for California Domestic Partnership, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 427 (2003) (comparing the eligibility requirements and consequences of California's

Domestic Partnership Program with those of various other state and municipal domestic partnership
programs).
100. "Domestic partnership" is the term most commonly used in the United States. See
generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social
Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992); Nancy J. Knauer,
Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than
Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998). "Registered partnership"
is more common in European countries. See LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A
STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenees

eds., 2001).
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The Law Commission of Canada recommends a registration system
open to both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.' l ' The
Commission does not specify that registration must confer specific rights
and responsibilities; rather it suggests that registration might offer
10 2
various models for voluntary assumption of mutual responsibilities.
The Commission's analysis also refers to an earlier report on relationship
recognition from the British Columbia Law Institute, which also
recommended a relationship registration model. 0 3 This Part briefly
explores possible registration schemes from the perspectives of both
eligibility criteria and ensuing entitlements and obligations.
A.

Eligibility Criteria

Almost all domestic partnership models extend eligibility for
registration to one of the following three categories of relationships:
1) same-sex couples only; 10 4 2) same-sex and opposite-sex couples;'0 5
101. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 117.
102. Seeid.at 120-21.
103. See id. at 120 (citing BCLI REPORT, supra note 8).
104. In the United States, Vermont's civil union status falls into this category. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1202 (2003). It is also the model in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland, among others.
See, e.g., Danish Registered Partnership Act, Act No. 372 of June 1, 1989, § 1 (Den.) [hereinafter Danish
Registered Partnership Act] (last amended by Danish Act Amending the Danish Registered Partnership
Act, Act No.360 of June 2, 1999). An English translation of the original text of the law is available at
http://www.qrd.org/qrd/world/europe/denmark/registered.partnership.act.with.amendments. The full text
of the Danish Registered Partnership Act as amended is available in English translation at
http://www.civildir.dk/regler/regipartnership.htm; Bill on Registered Partnerships (Norway 1995),
available at http://www.france.qrd.org/texts/partnership/no/norway-en.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2004); Lag om registrerat partnerskap [Law on registered partnerships], ch. 3, § 2 (Swed. 1994)
[hereinafter Swedish Registered Partnership Act], reprinted in 1994 Svensk fdrfattningssamling
[SFS] 1117, available at http://rixlex.riksdagen.se/htbin/thw/?$ {BASE} =SFST&${THWIDS}=9.24]
10736048641070&$ {HTML}=SFSTDOK&$ {TRIPSHOW}-=format=THW&$ {THWURLSAVE}
=24]10736048641070; 564th Bill On the Recognized Partnership (1996) (Iceland), available at
http://www.france.qrd.org/texts/partnership/is/iceland-bill.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). The
Women and Equality Unit of the British Government has recently proposed a same-sex couples only
Civil Partnership regime for England and Wales. See CIVIL PARTNERSHIP: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
LEGAL

RECOGNITION

OF

SAME-SEX

COUPLES

9

(2003),

available

at

http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
105. The Netherlands adopts this approach. See Kees Waaldijk, Major Legal Consequences of
Civil Marriage, Registered Partnerschip [sic], and Informal Cohabitationfor Different-Sex and
Same-Sex Partners in.: The Netherlands, Scotland, England and Wales, available at
http://athena.leidenuniv.nl/rechten/meijers/index.php3?m=&c=85&garb=0.9965597598708904&ses
sion= (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (providing textual and graphical displays of the legal consequences
of registered partnership and civil marriage laws in Netherlands, including that both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples are eligible for both). Other examples of domestic partnership laws that provide
benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples include France and some Spanish provinces. See
Title XII: Of Civil Covenants, Of Solidarity and Of Concubinage, C.C. chap. I, art. 515-1 (1999)
(France), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codestraduits/code-civil-textA.htm (last
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and 3) same-sex couples and individuals related to each other to a degree
that would prevent them from marrying.' 0 6 Each of these categories is
flawed. A small number of jurisdictions extend eligibility to a wider
and should be considered models for future
group of relationships
07
registration schemes. 1
The three dominant categories express distinct underlying visions.
Allowing only same-sex couples to register validates marriage as the
proper norm. Thus, opposite-sex couples, who are permitted to marry,
10 8
must marry to obtain relationship-based rights and responsibilities.
This category does not support alternative family structures; rather it
acknowledges the value of gay and lesbian couples and expresses the
inequity of denying such couples access to some, or even most, of the
incidents accorded spouses. Eligibility criteria customarily eliminate two
individuals of the same sex who would be prohibited from marrying
were they of opposite sex, thus evidencing marriage as the analogous
relationship. Two sisters, or a grandmother and a granddaughter, no
matter how emotionally and economically intertwined, cannot register.
Conjugal relationships, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, are therefore
supported above equally committed relationships between relatives.
The category that includes same-sex couples and relatives unable to
marry similarly validates marriage as the proper norm because it

visited Jan. 19, 2004); Articles of the Unmarried Couples Law (1999) (Aragon, Spanish Province)
(noting that while the government recognizes both same-sex and opposite-sex couples in its
unmarried couples law, it provides different benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiters).
106. Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary is an example of this category. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 572C-4 (2003). Vermont adopted a hybrid of this category and the first category by extending civil
union status to same-sex couples and the status of reciprocal beneficiary, enabling two people to
make healthcare and burial decisions for each other but providing no other benefits, only to relatives
prohibited from marrying (if of opposite sex) or entering civil unions (if of same sex). See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003) (civil unions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (2003).
107. See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
108. California expresses a slight modification of this vision. It allows opposite-sex couples to
register as domestic partners if one is over the age of sixty-two. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West
2003). Although such couples are permitted to marry, for many marriage will reduce the monetary
benefits one or both receives under Social Security laws. See Domestic Partnership Act, Cal. Legis.
Serv. Chap. 588 (A.B. 26) S. Fl. At 11 (1999), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill-number-ab_26&sess=9900&house=B&site=sen (last visited Jan. 19, 2004)
(setting forth analysis regarding the inclusion of senior citizens within the eligibility requirements
for domestic partnership registration). Thus, they have a strong financial incentive not to marry, and
their refusal to do so is not a repudiation of the institution of marriage but rather a practical solution
to their economic circumstances. See id. Recognizing this context in which older couples choose not
to marry, California has elected to treat their decision as the functional equivalent of being unable to
marry. See id.
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excludes opposite-sex couples. 109 This category does, however, recognize
the importance of certain familial, non-conjugal, relationships and allows
those in such relationships certain benefits.
Extending eligibility to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples
validates the choice of heterosexuals to remain unmarried and thus has
the potential to chip away at the privileged legal status of marriage. Such
regimes, however, are geared toward conjugal relationships, even though
engaging in sexual relations is not specified as an eligibility criterion.' l0
Intent to recognize only conjugal relationships is evidenced by exclusion
from registration of all those who would be unable to marry under state
incest laws.
In contrast to these three dominant models, the District of Columbia
expresses a broad vision of what relationships matter. Its eligibility
criteria extend to two individuals in "a familial relationship...
characterized by mutual caring and the sharing of a mutual residence.""'
Same-sex couples, opposite-sex couples, and those in non-conjugal
relationships are thus all qualified to register.
Madison, Wisconsin also defines eligibility for registration broadly.
Domestic partners must be in a "relationship of mutual support, caring,
and commitment and intend to remain in such a relationship in the
immediate future.... Mutual support means that the domestic partners
contribute mutually to the maintenance and support of the domestic
partnership throughout its existence."' 1 2 They must live together as "a
single, nonprofit housekeeping unit, whose relationship is of permanent
and distinct domestic character," and their relationship must not be
"merely temporary, social, political, commercial, or economic in
nature."' 13
The criteria of shared residence in both the District of Columbia and
Madison laws, and indeed in most domestic partnership laws, is
problematic, given that married couples are not required to live together.
109. Eligibility for registration under Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiary statute is limited to
"parties [that must] be legally prohibited from marrying one another under chapter 572," the State's
marriage statute. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4(4) (2003).
110. The law of marriage, on the other hand, assumes heterosexual intercourse as a fundamental
requirement. For an analysis of how law expresses this requirement, see generally Sally F. Goldfarb,
Family Law, Marriage, and Heterosexuality: Questioning the Assumptions, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.

RTS. L. REV. 285 (1998). Professor Goldfarb advocates removing this requirement from marriage,
thus facilitating marriage by both same-sex couples and by two people not in a sexual relationship.
See id at 300-01. Although I prefer implementation of the BC methodology, Professor Goldfarb's
approach would also end marriage as we know it.
111.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (2003).

112. Madison, Wis., Equal Opportunities Ordinance at § 3.23(2)(o)(1), (z).
113. Id. at § 3.32(o)(6)-(7).
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District of Columbia regulations clarify that a partner does not abandon
the mutual residence, resulting in partnership termination, if that partner
acquires an additional residence. 1 4 Beyond Conjugality and the British
Columbia Law Institute ("BCLI") report both recommend that there be
no such requirement for registration.' 15
No registration system currently allows more than two people to
register as each other's domestic partners. Beyond Conjugality mentions,
but does not develop, the desirability of extending registration beyond
couples. 1 6 The BCLI report notes that a "significant minority" of its
board opposed restricting domestic partnership to two people. 1 7 The
report states the issue might be reconsidered after a period of experience
with domestic partnerships. Similarly, eligibility criteria universally
18
specify that a person may have only one domestic partner."
This limitation may be necessary for some purposes, such as
healthcare decisionmaking, where one person must have the delegated
authority. Conservation of scarce resources may in some instances also
require the designation of only one domestic partner. For other purposes,
however, limiting registration to family units of two adults unnecessarily
perpetuates a normative vision of family structure that, while no doubt
accurate in the majority of instances, omits some committed, familial
relationships deserving of recognition. 119
114. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29, §§ 8002.1, 8002.2 (1992).
115. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 120; BCLI REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
116. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supranote 8, at 119. In a footnote, the report states:
[I]nprinciple, the Law Commission sees no reason to limit registration to two people.
Registration should capture situations involving three siblings or four housemates, so
long as the relationships are characterized by economic or emotional interdependence of
some duration. The values and principles of autonomy and state neutrality require that
people be free to choose the form and nature of their close personal adult relationships.
This issue, however, requires further consideration of factors, such as potential for abuse
and exploitation, conflicting interests and claims, and potential costs to third parties.
Id. at 133 n.16.
117. BCLI REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. Expansion beyond two people "would serve the needs,
for example, of a family unit consisting of brothers and sisters, each wishing to ensure that various
entitlements, such as employment benefits, would be equally available to all." Id.
118. A person who is married cannot have a domestic partner. Typically, marriage by one
partner automatically terminates the domestic partnership. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4
(2003) (stating that "[n]either of the parties [can] be married nor a party to another reciprocal
beneficiary relationship"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003) (noting that in order to meet the
eligibility criteria for entering a civil union, parties may "[n]ot be a party to another civil union or a
marriage").
119. In addition to family units consisting of three siblings or other relatives, three or more
individuals may be in a polyamorous relationship and may wish to assume obligations towards one
another and obtain legal recognition of their family for some purposes. See generally Maura I.
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B. Entitlements and Obligations
The incidents of domestic partner registration vary substantially,
from individual, isolated rights, such as hospital visitation, to widespread
benefits and obligations close to those accorded spouses. Canadian law
professor Nicole LaViolette divides the rights and duties arising under
existing registration schemes into two categories, which she calls
"Marriage Minus" and "Blank Slate Plus."' 120 "Marriage Minus" models
are socially and functionally like marriage and fall just short of
conferring all the entitlements and obligations of marriage. 12z "Blank
Slate Plus" schemes grant particular rights and obligations to those
who
2
1
status.
quasi-marital
a
conferring
without
none,
have
otherwise
An alternative method of categorizing registration schemes would
look at the means provided for terminating the relationship. Some permit
termination only under the jurisdiction's divorce laws.' 23 Others permit
termination, unilaterally, by the filing of a statement to that effect. 24 This
differentiation expresses whether drafters expect dissolution of the
partnership to engender the property division and ongoing financial
support issues that accompany divorce. Comparing these categories with
those articulated by Professor LaViolette, the "Marriage Minus" schemes
almost always require divorce with its financial consequences. The
"Blank Slate Plus" model always permits more simple termination.
Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: ConsideringPolyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV.
439, 444-65 (2003) (describing the forms of "multi-partner relating" that constitute polyamory);
Martha M. Ertman, Marriageas a Trade. Bridging the Private/PrivateDistinction, 36 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (defining, and arguing for recognition of, sexual and non-sexual
polyamorous affiliations); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 288-92 (1999) (describing both polygamy and "polyparenting," the practice of a
biological mother, non-biological mother, and biological father raising a child together).
120. Nicole LaViolette, Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Partnershipsas an
Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada, CANADIAN J. FAM. L. 116, 119 (2002).
121. See id at 122. The Registered Partnership laws of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the
Netherlands, and Quebec Province, as well as Vermont's Civil Union status, fall within this model.
See id. at 122-23.
122. See id. at 122. "Rather than subtracting from the marriage ceiling, these registered
partnerships add a bundle of rights and obligations onto what was previously a blank slate." Id.
Examples of such regimes include the PACS in France, the "reciprocal beneficiaries" designations in
Hawaii and Vermont, provisions in several regions of Spain, and numerous domestic partnership
registration mechanism established at the municipal level and by private employers in the United
States. See id. at 127-29.
123. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003); Danish Registered Partnership Act, supra
note 104; Bill on Registered Partnerships, supra note 104; Swedish Registered Partnership Act,
supranote 104; 564th Bill On the Recognized Partnership, supra note 104.
124. See Gonen, supra note 99, at 341-44 (explaining the various features of municipal
domestic partnership laws, including that termination is most commonly provided in the case of the
death of one partner or by a statement filed with the clerk).
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There is an interrelationship between eligibility criteria and the
extent of entitlements and obligations incurred through registration.
Government creates a "Marriage Minus" model when it accepts marriage
as the proper reference point and when its objective is to confer a
marriage-like status on gay and lesbian couples, therefore most such
models are open only to gay and lesbian couples.' 25 "Blank Slate Plus"
models vary dramatically in the level of benefits and obligations they
confer, and they vary equally in their eligibility criteria.
The Law Commission of Canada considers replacing civil marriage
with relationship registration open to all. Religious marriage could
continue unimpeded by the state. The Commission notes many
advantages of this approach.12 6 Nonetheless, the Commission falls short
of endorsing such a proposal, noting that it would face popular
opposition because many regard marriage as a "legal mechanism ...
fundamental to their commitment."'' 27 The Commission recommends
establishment of registration schemes along with expansion of marriage
28
to include same-sex couples.1
At the moment, no jurisdiction offers multiple relationship
registration options and allows individuals to choose for themselves
among them. The concept behind establishing registration options,
however, is similar to the choice given couples marrying in Louisiana
whether to marry under the state's covenant marriage laws or under the
29
standard marriage laws that were previously the only regime available.'
Those who choose covenant marriage must complete premarital
counseling and face stiffer grounds for divorce if their relationship
deteriorates.1 3 By providing these two options, the state recognizes the
value of allowing couples some choice in establishing the terms of their
relationship.
Registration options might be tailored as follows: Relationships
characterized as primarily emotional, rather than economic, in nature,
125. See LaViolette, supra note 120, at 132. Netherlands is the exception.
126. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 123.
127. Id. at 124.
128. Seeid. at 130.
129. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2003) (explaining that couples can opt into a
covenant marriage by declaring their intent to do so on their marriage license and by filing an
official intent to contract as provided by the law).
130. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 102, 103 (West 2003) (stating the different standards for
obtaining a divorce under Louisiana's regular marriage statute and Louisiana's covenant marriage
statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 2003) (noting the counseling requirements and the
more difficult termination process under a covenant marriage as opposed to a typical marriage under
Louisiana's state law).
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might be registered to establish the individual entitled to make healthcare
and burial decisions, take family and medical leave, and have testimonial
privileges. 131 Relationships that also include the care of one person by the
other, through caregiving or financial support, might be registered to
establish entitlement to government and private benefits, recovery for
wrongful death, and treatment as a single economic unit for income tax
purposes. 3 2 Economically interdependent partners who expect their
relationship to extend indefinitely might in addition to the above choose
an option that would trigger adjustment of financial
circumstances
33
between the two should their relationship dissolve.
131. David Chambers has proposed a status along these lines, entitled "designated friends."
David L. Chambers, Unmarried Partnersand the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin: For the Best of
Friendsand For Lovers ofAll Sorts, A Status Other Than Marriage,76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347,
1348 (2001). The status would be available to any two unmarried persons. Designated friends would
have no financial obligations towards each other, or towards third parties on behalf of each other,
and the government would not be required to provide benefits such as Social Security as a result of
the designated friend status. See id. at 1353. The two persons, would, however, make financial and
medical decisions for each other in the event of incapacity, have the right to family leave to care for
each other, have some status under intestacy laws, have the same testimonial privilege as spouses if
they had been registered for two years, and be subject to government anti-nepotism rules. See id.
William Eskridge articulates the idea of a "menu" of options, including: living together, with nothing
formal unless the couple makes a contract; domestic partnership, a public statement without strong
commitments; and marriage. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sheila Rose Foster, Discussionof Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV 329, 334 (1998). His "menu" does not, however,
include a choice of registration options.
132. Professor Eskridge criticizes typical domestic partnership laws that confer few benefits.
His principle criticism, however, is not the paucity of benefits but the fact that such laws require no
assumption of obligations. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 123, at 289. He contends that seeking benefits
without insisting on concomitant obligations "[misses] the main functional point of marriage." Id. I
approach registration from a different perspective. The point of relationship registration is to
recognize the function that the relationship actually serves. When partners are economically and
emotionally interdependent, they fulfill a function that is good for their own flourishing and for
society as a whole. They need not be in a marriage, or even a conjugal relationship, to serve this
function. Conferral of benefits under such circumstances appropriately reflects the obligations that
the partners have voluntarily undertaken.
133. Failure to register would not automatically bar property division and ongoing support at
the termination of a relationship. In some instances, ascription of a status entitling access to relevant
marital dissolution principles is appropriate. Chapter 6 of the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS reflects this

approach by defining the circumstances under which an unmarried opposite-sex or same-sex couple
will be subject to the property and compensatory spousal payments principles. See AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION chap. 6 (2002). BEYOND
CONJUGALITY disfavors ascription because it risks assigning ongoing obligations to those who have
explicitly eschewed them. If the government provides appropriate mechanisms for individuals to
define for themselves the terms of their relationships, ascription would be necessary only to prevent
exploitation. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 116.
The report of the British Columbia Law Institute similarly disfavors ascription. It argues that:
Under a principle of voluntariness, the law should not impose rights and obligations
on people who live together unless either (a) they (expressly or tacitly) accept those
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Even multiple registration options, each open to all, should be but a
part of a legal regime governing close personal relationships. To
complement, rather than supplant, the careful evaluation of laws
contained in Beyond Conjugality, the availability of registration must not
change the Law Commission's basic premises. When relationships
matter to achieving a law's objectives, individuals, when appropriate,
should be able to define for themselves what relationships matter. When
self-definition is unworkable, the availability of registration should not
obviate the necessity of including within every law the range of
relationships relevant to achieving that law's objectives.
Marcia Lewis should not have been required to testify against her
daughter. 34 A New Mexico grandmother was properly permitted to
recover for loss of consortium upon her granddaughter's negligently
caused death. 135 Numerous relationships are properly subjected to civil
protection order provisions of domestic violence statutes. 36 These results
are correct because the included relationships accurately reflect the
proper objectives of the relevant law. Such an analysis must be done for
every law even if registration is also available.
IV.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A DIVERSION FROM

A MORE JUST REFORM OF THE LAW OF FAMILIES

The way in which lesbian and gay advocates argue for same-sex
marriage threatens to push American law in the wrong direction by
widening the divide between the status of marriage and the status of
other relationships. Advocates make their case by emphasizing the many
disadvantages gay and lesbian couples suffer and attributing those
hardships to the inability to marry. 37 Of course unmarried heterosexual
obligations, or (b) another policy, such as the principle of [protecting the vulnerable], is
applicable and, in the circumstances, should be accorded greater weight than the principle
of voluntariness.
BCLI REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.

134. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
137. For example, the lead plaintiffs in the Massachusetts same-sex marriage case state that "we
still can't transfer assets to our spouse, benefit from each other's social security should one of us die,
and we worry about emergencies when we travel, even with all the proper documentation."
http://www.glad.org/marriage/Julie&Hillary.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Two plaintiff couples express the need for tax and other protections as they
contemplate retirement and estate planning, see http://www.glad.org/marriage/Robert&David.shtml

(last visited Jan. 12, 2004) and http://www.glad.org/marriage/Gloria&Linda.shtm

(last visited Jan.

12, 2004); three express concern about ability to secure appropriate medical care in an emergency,
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couples share the disadvantages of same-sex couples, but their ability to
marry, in the eyes of same-sex marriage advocates, turns complaints
about these disadvantages into a matter of "choice" rather than
inequality.
The Law Commission of Canada exposes the fallacy of applying
choice-based rhetoric to the decision to marry. When the state "provides
one relationship status with more benefits and legal support than others,
or... imposes more penalties on one type of relationship than it does on
others" it applies coercion and negates the possibility of people freely
choosing their close personal relationships. 138 When gay and lesbian
marriage advocates argue that they seek the choice to marry, rather than
marriage, they ignore the "special rights" that marriage affords. The
plaintiff couples in the Massachusetts gay marriage case understandably
seek numerous benefits that would improve their family life in both
economic and emotional ways. 139 Our legal system currently provides
those benefits only to those who are married. 140 If the benefits were
available to a wider range of 14relationships,
then marriage might actually
1
be a choice for those couples.
see
http://www.glad.org/marriage/Robert&David.shtm
(last visited
Jan.
12,
2004),
http://www.glad.org/marriage/Gloria&Linda.shtml
(last
visited
Jan.
12,
2004),
and
http://www.glad.org/marriage/Michael&Ed.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). One couple is
stretched financially by the need to purchase additional health insurance for the partner who is a fulltime student since the employed partner's insurance cannot cover an unmarried couple. See
http://www.glad.org!marriage/Richard&Gary.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
138. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 18.
139. See Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 949 & n.6 (Mass. 2003).
140. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
141. 1 develop a critique of choice-based rhetoric more fully elsewhere. See generally Polikoff,
Lesbians and Gay Men, supranote 7. For an extensive analysis of what the author calls "compulsory
matrimony," see Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L.
REv. 709, 777-800 (2002). Robson notes:
Lesbians and gay men are included in the statement that "most of us have been brought
up with expectations that we will marry," yet our personal "choice," no less than the
choice of heterosexuals, is overdetermined by external social forces. Thus, the desire or
choice to marry should be as open to question as the desire or choice to be heterosexual.
Social, political and legal forces combine to produce a system of compulsory
matrimony. Thus far, this system has excluded same-sex couples. Nevertheless, any quest
for lesbian and gay marriage occurs within this coercive construct.
Id. at 799-800 (footnotes omitted).
In her thorough analysis of the values that should underlie gay and lesbian family policy,
Valerie Lehr points out that "each time people 'choose' to marry, they strengthen the institution, at
least in part, because they have less of an incentive to oppose the benefits they receive as married
people."

VALERIE LEHR, QUEER FAMILY VALUES: DEBUNKING

THE MYTH OF THE NUCLEAR

FAMILY 36 (1999). 1 would add my hunch that if lesbians and gay men achieve the right to marry,
advocacy organizations will have less incentive to support extending the benefits that married
couples receive to a wider range of personal relationships.
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When advocates for same-sex marriage invoke the very two-tiered
structure that privileges marriage as a reason why lesbians and gay men
must have access to the favored tier, they accept that two-tiered structure
as a natural and unquestioned phenomenon. 42 Worse still, advocates
often extol marriage as a badge of maturity, commitment, and
citizenship. 43 Such arguments place gay and lesbian advocacy on the
142. 1 do not mean to suggest that all advocates for same-sex marriage support the privileged
status of marriage. Some would be happy to reduce or eliminate the disparity between the legal
treatment of marriage and that afforded other significant relationships. But it is not rhetorically
possible to say at the same time 1) that it harms real people, in tangible and intangible ways, to deny
gay and lesbian couples the benefits and privileged status conferred by marriage and that therefore
gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to marry; and 2) that the state should no longer confer
benefits privileged status on married couples that it denies to other equally valuable relationships.
For an analysis of the significance of the rhetoric used in advocating same-sex marriage, see
generally Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV.
1535 (1993).
143. This rhetoric appears in many contexts. Most recently, advocates have argued to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that creation of a civil union status would not satisfy the
court's mandate in Goodridge.Plaintiff's lawyers in their briefs argued that marriage is unique in its
ability to express love and commitment and confer security for children. Brief of Interested
Party/Amicus Curiae Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders at 23-27, In the Matter of a Request
for an Advisory Opinion from the President of the Senate (No. 09163). They quote with approval
historian Nancy Cott for the principle that "[m]arriage has an attribute of legitimacy that has been
earned through many years of validation and institutionalization." Id. at 26 (citation omitted). An
amicus brief filed on behalf of numerous gay and lesbian organizations states as follows:
The word "marriage" is both a tangible and intangible protection because the term
"marriage" evokes a common vocabulary understood across cultures and generations.
People understand that a couple who is married shares a loving, committed, and
hopefully enduring relationship. That simply is not the case with "civil union," or any
other attempted marriage-facsimile that a state might create....

... No other term besides "marriage" conveys the true character of a couple's
relationship to the outside world. No other term carries with it the same weighty
historical connotation of commitment, through thick and thin, that can impact not only
the perception of the outside world, but also the experience of a couple within a
committed relationship. No other term provides the same opportunity for the strongest
possible public expression of a couple's commitment to one another and their family.
No other term says to a couple's children: "our relationship, and our family, is built
on the most solemn promise of mutual dedication and self-sacrifice." No other term
provides parents who want to impart to their children a profound respect for the
institution of marriage the same opportunity to be role models....
Moreover, no other term fully ties same-sex couples into the fabric of our community
of families-a community in which we are surrounded by images on television, on the
radio, and in the movies of "married" couples and their families ....
[Creation of a separate civil union status] would deny individuals in same-sex
relationships access to the undeniably significant social content attendant to "marriage,"
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wrong side of an intense culture war. 144 To be sure, opponents of samesex marriage populate that side of the culture war as well.145 But what all
on that side share is a conviction that the good of marriage is so profound
and basic to a well functioning society that law and policy can single out
marriage for "special rights" unavailable to other emotionally and
economically interdependent units. 146 On the other side of the culture war
are those, like myself, who value equally all family forms and who
therefore want just social policies that facilitate maximum economic
well-being and emotional flourishing for all, not only for those who
marry. 147
including the ability to make the profound and broadly understood public commitment of
marriage. ... and to participate fully and as an equal in a community that recognizes,
respects, and in many cases, privileges the status of marriage.
Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Campaign, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force et al. at 2529, Goodridge v. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-09163).
144. A thorough critique of advocacy in favor of gay marriage is found in MICHAEL WARNER,
THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 81-147 (1999).

145. A major player in the culture war is the Institute for American Values, which describes
itself as "a private, nonpartisan organization devoted to contributing intellectually to the renewal of
marriage and family life as the sources of competence, character, and citizenship." INSTITUTE FOR
AMERICAN

VALUES,

INSTITUTE

AT

A

GLANCE,

at

http://www.americanvalues.org/html/institute at a_glance.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
146. Among those favoring both a privileged status for marriage and access to marriage by
lesbians and gay men are Milton Regan, see FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 119-28

(1993), and Elizabeth Scott, see Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, __ U. CHI. LEGAL F. _
(forthcoming) (paper delivered at University of Chicago
Legal Forum, Oct. 2003) (on file with author). Among gay and lesbian advocates, this view is
expressed by Jonathan Rauch in GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004). Warner writes:
[S]tate recognition of nonstandard households is being rolled back in the United States
and is increasingly targeted by a neoconservative program of restricting divorce,
punishing adultery, stigmatizing illegitimacy, and raising tax incentives for marriage. The
campaign for marriage may be more in synchrony with that program than its advocates
intend.
WARNER, supra note 148, at 125.
147. Professor Jane Schacter writes:
I fear that strategies [valorizing and romanticizing marriage] will undermine the real
pluralism of affiliate structures that I think we should seek .... I fear that these strategies
draw same-sex marriage advocates-unintentionally, to be sure-into the lamentable
larger dynamics that sustain contemporary single-mother bashing.... To posit marriage
as marking a unique form of commitment seems inescapably to devalue other family
arrangements.
Jane S. Schacter, Taking the InterSEXional Imperative Seriously: Sexual Orientation and Marriage
Reform, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1255, 1262-63 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political
Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 585-602 (1997) (citing the importance that non-white cultures
place on extended rather than nuclear families as a means of social organization and child rearing as
one facet of a multidimensional analysis that criticizes lesbian and gay advocates who prioritize
achieving same-sex marriage over other issues); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriagefor Social

28

Polikoff: Ending Marriage as We Know It

20031

ENDING MARRIAGE AS WE KNOW IT

Demanding equality among equally valuable relationships, instead
of marriage as the remedy for the disadvantages facing gay and lesbian
couples, would produce both different legal strategies and different
rhetoric. In Baker v. State,148 advocates for same-sex couples had the
state constitution's Common Benefits Clause on which to base their legal
demands. The clause provides that "government is, or ought to be,
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage
of any single person, family, set of persons, who are a part only of that
community., 1 49 As the Vermont Supreme Court articulated, "the
Common Benefits Clause expressed a vision of government that afforded
every Vermonter its benefit and protection and provided no Vermonter
particular advantage., 1 50 Advocates could have used this clause to

challenge the privileged status of marriage in Vermont; they could have
argued that the special rights accorded married couples in Vermont
unconstitutionally advantaged one type of family over others; they could
have asked the court to require that the state articulate the objectives of
all of the laws singling out marriage for distinct treatment and that the
state include within the sphere of each law all relationships equally able
to fulfill the state's objective. Instead, they argued only for allowing
same-sex couples access to marriage.
Vermont's response to the mandate of Baker v. State was the
creation of civil unions, a status for same-sex couples that confers all of
the rights and obligations of marriage under state law.' 51 It is not
available to opposite-sex couples. Thus, Vermont has compounded the
inequality of its laws. This denial of equality may mirror the exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage, but two wrongs don't make a right.
This is not some trivial complaint; it is formal inequality with serious

Policy, _

VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. _

(forthcoming 2004). For an articulation of the value of

family forms in the context of opposition to promoting marriage for those receiving TANF, see
Gwendolyn Mink, Martha Fineman & Anna Marie Smith, No Promotion of Marriage in TANF!, at

http://falcon.arts.comell.edu/ams3/npmposition.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). The organization
most visibly advocating support for all family forms is the Council on Contemporary Families. See
generally http://www.contemporaryfamilies.org.
148.

744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

149. Id. at 867.
150. Id. at 875.
151. See H. 847, 2000 Gen. Assem. (Vt. 2000) (stating the purpose of Vermont's Civil Union
legislation was "to respond to the constitutional violation found by the Vermont Supreme Court in
[Baker v. State], and to provide eligible same-sex couples the opportunity to 'obtain the same
benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples').
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implications. 152 Recognizing, but affording a paltry number of benefits
to, relationships between relatives, Vermont also created "reciprocal
beneficiary" status, conferring the right to make health related and burial
decisions.1 53 Adding another layer of inequality to the Vermont scheme,
no two persons eligible to marry or enter a civil union can register as
reciprocal beneficiaries.
Rhetoric emphasizing equality of equally valuable relationships
would never invoke the two tiered structure that privileges marriage as a
reason why same-sex couples should have access to the privileged tier.
An example from a paper available on the web site of Lambda Legal, a
nationally prominent lesbian and gay rights legal organization,
exemplifies the available rhetorical, legal, and political options. The
paper is entitled, Denying Access to MarriageHarms Families.154
Ronnie in New York City developed a grave illness and needed her
partner of over twenty years, Elaine, to assist her in getting to medical
appointments[.] Ronnie would suffer black-outs walking in the street.
Elaine requested family medical leave from her employer to cover the
periodic appointments,
but the employer said no because Ronnie was
155
not a "spouse."'
But Ronnie doesn't need a spouse; she needs care. A spouse or its
nonmarital equivalent could provide that care-if she has such a
partner-but so could Ronnie's niece, her sister, her closest friend, or a
group of her closest friends. And such people must provide the needed
care if Ronnie doesn't have a partner. The AIDS crisis, attention to
which remains a part of Lambda Legal's mission, should have

152. For an impassioned and articulate review of the harm this inequality causes for
heterosexual women, see Mary Ann Case, What Stake Do Heterosexual Women Have in the SameSex Marriage/DomesticPartnership/Civil Union Debates (paper delivered at the North American
Regional Conference of the International Society of Family Law) (June 2003)
(The bifurcated regime Vermont created sends a message of subordination toboth gays
and lesbians on the one hand and heterosexual women on the other, while reaffirming
patriarchy .... By restricting ... male-female couples to marriage, it forces women who

wish to unite themselves to men under state law to do so in an institution whose legal
history is one of subordinating wives both practically and symbolically.).
Ruthann Robson asserts that "the civil union exclusion of heterosexual couples should offend our
notions of formal equality in the same manner that the marital exclusion of lesbian and gay couples
offends us." Ruthann Robson, supra note 145, at 754.
153.
154.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1301 (2003).
See
Lambda
Legal,
Denying Access

to

Marriage

Harms

Families,

at

http://web.archive.org/web/20021230202805/http:lambdalegal.org/cgibin/lowa/documents/record?record=873 (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
155. Id.
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illuminated the fallacy of expecting any one individual to care for
someone with extensive medical needs.
The solution to Ronnie's crisis, to the extent the law can facilitate
one, is a Family and Medical Leave Act-a caregiving leave act-that
allows anyone with whom she has a close personal relationship to take
her to her medical appointments without fear of being fired. Any law that
permits such caregiving leave but limits who may take such leave to
spouses or a narrow group of family members 156 defeats the important
purpose of such a law-facilitating caregiving by those who are willing
to provide such care to those with whom they have close personal
relationships.
Lambda Legal posits the solution to Ronnie's crisis as legalizing
same-sex marriage. But what if her spouse, Elaine, dies? Or what if
Elaine can't afford to take the unpaid leave provided by the law? As a
lesbian, Ronnie may have fewer options for care by her parents, who are
eligible to take leave under current federal law; they may have rejected
her precisely because of her lesbianism, or she may have moved away
from her family of origin to a region of the country more socially and
politically supportive of lesbians and gay men. Ronnie's chosen family
of friends 157 may well include individuals able to transport her to her
medical appointments, as long as they do not have to lose their jobs to do
it.
Lambda Legal titles its paper, Denying Access to MarriageHarms
Families.'" But it would better serve the needs of all lesbians and gay
men if it joined with other advocacy groups in a campaign for a more just
law. 159 Such a law would serve the purpose of facilitating caretaking
156.

The federal Family Medical Leave Act mandates that an employer provide unpaid leave

when an employee's son or daughter is either bom or placed into the home for adoption or foster
care; when an employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent is suffering from a serious health
condition; and when the employee himself or herself is suffering from a serious health condition. 29
U.S.C.S. §§ 2611-2612 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
157. This phenomenon is developed extensively in KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE:
LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991).
158. See Lambda Legal, supranote 157.

159. There are models of Family and Medical Leave Act provisions that would solve Ronnie's
problem while supporting other close personal relationships as well. For example, the District of
Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act defines "family member" to include those related by
"blood, legal custody, or marriage"; a child living with the employee for whom the employee
"permanently assumes and discharges parental responsibility," and a person who lives with the
employee, or has lived with the employee within the past year, with whom the employee has a
"committed relationship." D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-501(4) (2003). While not capturing as many

relevant relationships as the recommendation of the Law Commission of Canada, this definition
covers many more relationships than does the federal Family and Medical Leave Act.
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while also addressing legitimate concerns of employers about both
possible abuse of the law and workplace efficiency. When the Law
Commission of Canada considered the issue, it came up with the
following recommendation:
Parliament should amend the Canada Labour Code to provide
employees with the right to take caregiving leave and to permit
employees to designate the relationships most meaningful to them for
the purposes of caregiving leave. To control the risk of abuse, the
legislation could place a cap on the number of days that an employee
could take for caregiving leave, or it could permit employees to provide
a list to employers of those persons with whom they have relationships
that may give rise to the need to provide care.160
CONCLUSION
Rather than invoke the advantages of marriage as grounds for access
by same-sex couples, advocates for lesbians and gay men could work to
create a more just network of laws, regulations, and programs that value
a wide range of close personal adult relationships. For some purposes,
relationship registration options would provide an effective mechanism
to allocate rights and responsibilities. Like marriage, however,
relationship registration is not the answer because it is an inaccurate
proxy for identifying what relationships matter for specific purposes.
In its Beyond Conjugality report, the Law Commission of Canada
has developed a useful methodology with which to reconsider all law and
social policy. It accords individuals maximum freedom to identify the
relationships that matter to them. When a law must delineate the
relationships to which it applies, the law should capture all those
relationships that are relevant to achieving the objectives of the law.
Some areas of American law already reflect the thinking that
underlies Beyond Conjugality, such as civil protection order statutes that
apply to the wide range of personal relationships in which domestic
violence occurs. Lasting commitment, care, love, and emotional and
economic support also occur in a wide range of relationships. When the
law can recognize and reflect this fact, we will have ended marriage as
we know it.

160.

BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 8, at 43.
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